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Role-based access control (RBAC) project at CERN was designed to protect 
from accidental and unauthorized access to the LHC and injector equipment. Our 
model of RBAC introduces concept of dynamic authorization. Dynamic authorization 
is the authorization algorithm which takes into account not only defined permissions, 
but also the internal state of each device server, called checking policy. This paper 
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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an approach to restrict system access to authorized users. 
Within an organization, roles are created for various job functions. The permissions to perform certain 
operations are assigned to specific roles. Members of staff (or other system users) are appointed 
particular roles, and through those role assignments acquire the permissions to perform particular 
system functions [1]. 
RBAC is a preventative and therefore inexpensive way to protect the accelerator equipment. It 
keeps users from putting the wrong settings or from illegal logging into the application. Other machine 
protection systems such as interlocks are reactive and once triggered it is expensive to recover 
operations. 
RBAC is also used to ensure machine stability during a run. Once the equipment is fine tuned and 
beam is in the machine, an error setting can disrupt operations for hours and lose valuable data. RBAC 
has been implemented in the Controls Middleware infrastructure so that access to equipment can be 
restricted according to Access Rules defined jointly by the equipment and operation groups. It is 
important to mention that RBAC is not a security system against hackers; it is designed only to prevent 
well meaning people from making the wrong setting, and unauthorized users who have no credentials 
from running a control applications. 
And last but not least, RBAC implements logging for each setting protected by access rules. This 
is crucial during commissioning and debugging. Each setting can be traced and errors in the sequencer 
or operations can be caught and corrected [2]. 
As a part of the problem solution we propose a new algorithm called dynamic authorization. This 
authorization method is based on different checking policies which can be changed at runtime. The 
subject of this paper is to describe the algorithm of dynamic authorization and the three different 
checking policies used by it. 
Authorization 
Authorization is the function of specifying access rights to resources or services. RBAC library is 
the part of each device server. In most cases, authorization occurs once the application makes a request 
to get, set, or monitor a property via CMW protocol. This request is made from the application via the 
CMW client to the CMW server. The CERN-RBAC token, obtained at authentication, is passed to the 
CMW client. There the digital signature is verified, and if valid, the token is sent to the CMW server. If the 
token is not valid a meaningful exception message is returned to the sender. The CMW looks up the 
permission in the access map and, depending on access rights, either grants access or blocks the 
request [3]. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the general overview of the authorization process at CERN. 





Figure 1: Authorization process. 
 
1. Access map loads from the local file on device server startup. 
2. Client application authenticates on the CERN-RBAC A1 server and obtains a valid token.  
3. Token is passed to the CMW client and then to the device server via CMW protocol. 
4. CMW server receives the accelerator mode from timing source. 
5. Dynamic authorization algorithm verifies user permissions and either allows to execute operation or 
throws an exception. 
6. Result of authorization process loggs for auditing. 
Dynamic Authorization 
Concept of the dynamic authorization is an additional restriction to the standard RBAC model. It’s a 
new approach proposed in the scope of extended RBAC model for distributed control system. At first we 
describe the motivations of this approach: 
1. Equipment functions in different modes. While device is working in the test mode it’s often 
necessary to allow access for wider range of users than during normal operation, in which case 
expansion of the access rules is not always desirable and appropriate. Because firstly it may lead to 
decreasing of the system security and secondly it requires significant administrative costs. We believe 
the introduction of different working modes of authorization may help to solve these problems. In this 
case authorization algorithm will take into account not only the access rules, but also the current working 
mode of the equipment. 
2. There are many devices and properties at CERN not protected by access rules yet. From 
the standard RBAC point of view the operations, not protected by privileges, cannot be executed by 
anybody. In practice we have a lot of unprotected equipment due to the size of the LHC, which contains 
hundreds of thousands different devices with dozens of properties each. So, it takes a lot of time to 
design access rules for all devices. As far as we cannot force equipment specialists to design these 




rules in a single day, we propose a flexible solution for regulating access to non-protected equipments. 
This allows us to deploy RBAC system step-by-step, without breaking existing infrastructure. It’s the 
crucial requirement for the access control system at CERN. 
3. Problem of non-authenticated clients. According to the standard RBAC concept, non-
authenticated user cannot execute any operation in the system. However there are several dozens of big 
systems at CERN and hundreds of software applications still not supporting identification. We cannot 
interrupt a work of such applications therefore we need to define flexible policies to handle requests of 
non-authenticated users. This will make us possible to introduce RBAC with relaxed checking algorithm 
first, and then we can gradually change authorization policy to more strict. 
 
Dynamic authorization is the algorithm of authorization taking into accounts not only access rules, 
but also internal state of the authorization subject. Moreover this approach defines default privileges for 
unprotected environment and non-authenticated users. This method implementation depends on 
different checking policies described in details in the following chapter. 
Checking Policies 
Checking policy is the authorization state of the equipment. Checking policy is defined at the level 
of every device and can be changed at runtime. Checking policy reflects the internal state of the device 
in terms of authorization. Currently we have 3 checking policies implemented in RBAC system. These 
are no-check, lenient and strict. Before detailed description of each policy it’s important to overview the 
access rules structure and to define whether the property is considered to be protected or not.  
To minimize the size of the access map, we list in the following table only access rules for the 
protected properties. The table displays for each property whether it’s obligatory or not. If the property is 
not present in the access rule, the default value is used instead. Wildcard ‘*’ is interpreted as ‘all values 
fit’ [4]. 
 
# Name Req. Def. Description 
1 Device Class Y  Class name (name of the corresponding FESA class) 
2 Property N * Property which is protected by access rule 
3 Device N * Device name 
4 Role N * Role of the person who can access property 
5 Application N * Application which may access property 
6 Location N * Location from which user may access property 
7 Mode N * Operational mode of the server 
8 Operation Y  Allowed operation (get/set/monitor) 
 
The property is considered to be protected if it’s protected at least by one access rule for the given 









boolean propertyProtected(Request request, AccessRule[] rules) 
{ 
    for each rule from rules 
    { 
      if (request.deviceClass == rule.deviceClass) 
        if (request.property == rule.property or rule.property == *) 
          if (request.device == rule.device or rule.device == *) 
            if (request.operation == rule.operation) 
              return true 
    } 
    return false 
} 
4.1 NO-CHECK 
Checking policy “no-check” grants access for each property without any verifying. Typically, this 
policy is used at design stage, when the device interface is not fixed and there are no access rules yet. It 
is also used during testing phase if we need to permit equipment access for additional users for a short 
period of time. This mode could be useful for system debugging or for other activities when it is required 
to disable RBAC authorization checks. 
 
Figure 2: No-check policy. 
4.2 LENIENT 
Checking policy “lenient” implements relaxed authorization. The algorithm gives access for the 
protected properties only if corresponding access rule permits it. User must be authenticated in the 
system in order to deal with protected properties. For unprotected properties access is not restricted for 
any users. Typically this policy is used at the testing stage, when access rules exist only for the most 
critical settings of the equipment. Some of the devices work in this mode permanently, because 
sometimes it’s desirable to restrict access only to significant settings while keeping others unprotected. 
This checking policy provides sufficient protection. Switching between no-check and lenient policy is 
considered as the step towards better security, and all equipment specialists are encouraged to do it. 
This is an intermediate stage between no-check and strict policy, which allows us to propagate RBAC in 
successive steps. 
In pseudo-code lenient policy could be described like this: 





boolean authorization(Token token, Request request, AccessRule[] rules) 
{ 
    if (propertyProtected(request, rules) == false) 
      return true 
  
    if (token == null || token.isValid() == false) 
      return false 
  
    if matchAccessRules(token, request, rules) 
      return true 
  




Figure 3: Lenient policy. 
4.3 STRICT 
Checking policy “strict” implies the most exacting verification. It always requires users to be 
authenticated in the system; otherwise user’s requests will be blocked. Access to the protected 
properties is granted only if there is an associated access rule. For unprotected properties access is 
permitted only for reading property value and monitoring operation. Setting new value, even for 
unprotected property, is forbidden. This checking policy is the strictest among existent at CERN. Our 
final goal is to propagate this mode as wide as possible, because it provides best security. All critical 
equipments are supposed to work in this mode. 




In pseudo-code strict police could be represented this way: 
boolean checkAccess(Token token, Request request, AccessRule[] rules) 
{ 
    if (null == token || token.isValid() == false) 
      return false 
  
    if (propertyProtected(request, rules) == false) 
    { 
      if (request.operation == set) 
        return false 
      else 
        return true 
    } 
  
    if matchAccessRules(token, request, rules) 
      return true 
  




Figure 4: Strict policy. 
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